This study examined whether worktime control buffered the impact of worktime demands on work-family interference (WFI), using data from 2,377 workers from various sectors of industry in The Netherlands. We distinguished among three types of worktime demands: time spent on work according to one's contract (contractual hours), the number of hours spent on overtime work (overtime hours), and the number of hours spent on commuting (commuting hours). Regarding worktime control, a distinction was made between having control over days off and (...) vacations (leave control) and having control over starting and finishing times (flextime). These three worktime demands were expected to have separate as well as joint effects on WFI, whereas worktime control should buffer these adverse effects of worktime demands on WFI. Stepwise regression analyses showed that working high numbers of contractual and overtime hours was indeed associated with high WFI. Further, worktime control indeed made a difference in terms of WFI: whereas leave control contributed directly to lower WFI, flextime buffered the adverse effects of long contractual workhours. Our results suggest that very long working days should be prevented, and that worktime control may be a powerful tool to help workers maintaining a good work-family balance. (shrink)

This article revisits the manuscript tradition and the different redactions of John Buridan’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. The aim of the article is threefold. First, it makes some corrections to the lists of manuscripts containing the third redaction and the final redaction of Buridan’s questions commentary on the Physics. Second, it argues that manuscript Zaragoza, Biblioteca Capitular de la Seo, cod. 15-61, ff. 1r-62v, contains a previously unknown version of the final redaction (together with the standard version from f. 62v (...) onwards). Third, to facilitate further study of the manuscripts of Buridan’s questions on the Physics and their mutual relations, appendices at the end of the article provide detailed tables of contents for the third redaction and the final redaction, as well as editions of selected questions from the Zaragoza manuscript, the third redaction of Buridan’s questions on the Physics, and the so-called Quaestiones breves. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically discuss Charles Taylor’s employment of the concept of ontology by shining a spotlight on a shift in emphasis from an anthropocentric to a non-anthropocentric viewpoint in his more recent writings on ontology. I also argue that Stephen White’s characterization of Taylor’s ‘weak’ ontology, while revealing, only partly explains Taylor’s position, as White’s interpretation leaves no room for the metaphysical thrust in Taylor’s thought. Drawing attention to a Taylor left out of White’s Taylor, I ultimately seek (...) to show why Taylor’s distinctive mode of argumentation is not consonant with White’s weak-ontological approach.Dans cet article, j’aborde la question de la notion d’ontologie chez Charles Taylor. Je constate, dans un premier temps, l’abandon par Taylor du point de vue anthropocentrique, ainsi que l’adoption d’une perspective non-anthropocentrique. Je remets ensuite en question l’interprétation de Stephen White, en insistant sur le fait qu’elle ne parvient pas à mettre en valeur l’inspiration métaphysique de la pensée de Taylor. J’estime, en conclusion, que Taylor s’appuie fondamentalement sur un mode d’argumentation métaphysique qui est sous-estimé lorsqu’on le présente comme un «ontologiste “faible”». (shrink)

IntroductionBrain tumours frequently cause language impairments and are also likely to co-occur with localised abnormal slow-wave brain activity. However, it is unclear whether this applies specifically to low-grade brain tumours. We investigate slow-wave activity in resting-state electroencephalography in low-grade glioma and meningioma patients, and its relation to pre- and postoperative language functioning.MethodPatients with a glioma infiltrating the language-dominant hemisphere and patients with a meningioma with mass effect on this hemisphere underwent extensive language testing before and 1 year after surgery. EEG (...) was registered preoperatively, postoperatively, and once in healthy individuals. Slow-wave activity in delta- and theta- frequency bands was evaluated visually and quantitatively by spectral power at three levels over the scalp: the whole brain, the affected hemisphere, and the affected region.ResultsGlioma patients had increased delta activity and increased theta activity before and after surgery. In these patients, increased preoperative theta activity was related to the presence of language impairment, especially to poor word retrieval and grammatical performance. Preoperative slow-wave activity was also related to postoperative language outcomes. Meningioma patients showed no significant increase in EEG slow-wave activity compared to healthy individuals, but they presented with word retrieval, grammatical, and writing problems preoperatively, as well as with writing impairments postoperatively.DiscussionAlthough the brain-tumour pathology in low-grade gliomas and meningiomas has a different effect on resting-state brain activity, patients with low-grade gliomas and meningiomas both suffer from language impairments. Increased theta activity in glioma patients can be considered as a language-impairment marker, with prognostic value for language outcome after surgery. (shrink)

Is a whole something more than the sum of its parts? Are there things composed of the same parts? If you divide an object into parts, and divide those parts into smaller parts, will this process ever come to an end? Can something lose parts or gain new ones without ceasing to be the thing it is? Does any multitude of things (including disparate things such as you, this book, and the tail of a cat) compose a whole of some (...) sort? Questions such as these have occupied us for at least as long as philosophy has existed. They define the field that has come to be known as mereology-the study of all relations of part to whole and of part to part within a whole-and have deep and far-reaching ramifications in metaphysics as well as in logic, the foundations of mathematics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and beyond. In Mereology, A. J. Cotnoir and Achille C. Varzi have compiled decades of advanced research into a comprehensive, up-to-date, and formally rigorous picture. The early chapters cover the more classical aspects of mereology; the rest of the book deals with variants and extensions. Whether you are an established professional philosopher, an interested student, or a newcomer, inside you will find all the tools you need to join this ever-evolving field of inquiry and theorize about all things mereological. (shrink)

Coady explores the challenges that morality poses to politics. He confronts the complex intellectual tradition known as realism, which seems to deny any relevance of morality to politics, especially international politics. He argues that, although realism has many serious faults, it has lessons to teach us: in particular, it cautions us against the dangers of moralism in thinking about politics and particularly foreign affairs. Morality must not be confused with moralism: Coady characterizes various forms of moralism and sketches their distorting (...) influence on a realistic political morality. He seeks to restore the concept of ideals to an important place in philosophical discussion, and to give it a particular pertinence in the discussion of politics. He deals with the fashionable idea of "dirty hands," according to which good politics will necessarily involve some degree of moral taint or corruption. Finally, he examines the controversial issue of the role of lying and deception in politics. Along the way Coady offers illuminating discussion of historical and current political controversies. This lucid book will provoke and stimulate anyone interested in the interface of morality and politics. (shrink)

abstract This paper aims to gain a deeper understanding of the different forms of moralism in order to throw light upon debates about the role of morality in international affairs. In particular, the influential doctrine of political realism is reinterpreted as objecting not to a role for morality in international politics, but to the baneful effects of moralism. This is a more sympathetic reading than that usually given by philosophers to the realist doctrines. I begin by showing the ambiguity and (...) elusiveness of realist claims about morality in politics and then distinguish six forms of moralism, understood as a distortion of genuine morality: moralism of scope, of imposition, of abstraction, of absolutism, of inappropriate explicitness, and of deluded power. I argue that most of these are relevant to typical realist claims and can make their objections more plausible. But, though realists can be interpreted as rightly drawing attention to the dangers of moralism in international and national affairs, their conflation of moralism with morality wrongly leads them to an exaltation of the pursuit of national interest and to the rejection of policies and judgements that are not in fact moralistic. (shrink)

abstract This paper aims to gain a deeper understanding of the different forms of moralism in order to throw light upon debates about the role of morality in international affairs. In particular, the influential doctrine of political realism is reinterpreted as objecting not to a role for morality in international politics, but to the baneful effects of moralism. This is a more sympathetic reading than that usually given by philosophers to the realist doctrines. I begin by showing the ambiguity and (...) elusiveness of realist claims about morality in politics and then distinguish six forms of moralism, understood as a distortion of genuine morality: moralism of scope, of imposition, of abstraction, of absolutism, of inappropriate explicitness, and of deluded power. I argue that most of these are relevant to typical realist claims and can make their objections more plausible. But, though realists can be interpreted as rightly drawing attention to the dangers of moralism in international and national affairs, their conflation of moralism with morality wrongly leads them to an exaltation of the pursuit of national interest and to the rejection of policies and judgements that are not in fact moralistic. (shrink)

In his Lives, Giorgio Vasari mentions many artists who were talented at music when they were young, prominently Giorgione and Sebastiano del Piombo. Benvenuto Cellini resisted his father's pressure to choose music. Why? How rewarding was a musical profession in Renaissance Italy? It could be very lucrative, both for town musicians such as Cellini's father and for castratos. Moonlighting for banquets, dances, even spying, could bring in additional income. For gentlemen, music was a necessary social grace; they had private tutors, (...) such as Silvestro Ganassi dal Fontego, who was himself a painter as well as a printer. Amateurs could learn from cathedral choirmasters, who were often music theorists, the pinnacle of the profession. The theorist Pietro Aaron, choirmaster at Imola Cathedral, then tutor to the sons of Sebastian Michiel, Grand Prior of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem in Venice, had a wide acquaintance among humanists, noblemen and other musicians, and his letters open a window on the life of a musician. Among his many professions, the writer Antonfrancesco Doni counted music; a madrigal he wrote in 1560 is included in an appendix. The ability to improvise verses and music was much prized, ranging from star performers such as Serafino Aquilano to amateurs such as Niccolò Machiavelli. Portraits of musicians are discussed; they offer important evidence but are difficult to interpret. The theorist Lodovico Zacconi concluded in 1592 that being a musician was not only an honourable and lucrative profession but an enjoyable one. (shrink)

When Huck Finn embarks upon his hilarious education of the slave Jim in the moral vagaries of the monarchies of Europe, he takes himself to be propounding the merest common sense. He may have thought large‐scale villainy restricted to autocracies, but his creator was clearly not so naive. More to the present point, Huck ends his discourse on princely rule with remarks that show he was not merely cataloguing the fact of widespread royal vice, but willing to countenance it as (...) necessary. As he puts it, ‘kings is kings, and you got to make allowances. Take them all around, they're a mighty ornery lot’. (shrink)

Recent epistemology has been notable for an emphasis, or a variety of emphases, upon the social dimension of knowledge. This has provided a corrective to the heavily individualist account of knowledge previously holding sway. It acknowledges the ways in which an individual is deeply indebted to the testimony of others for his or her cognitive endowments, both with respect to capacities and information. But the dominance of the individualist model was connected with a concern for the value of cognitive autonomy. (...) It is unclear how due recognition of the social dimension can allow for this value. It is argued here that there are ways of construing intellectual autonomy that not only can make it consistent with these new emphases but also respect its status as an epistemic concept. The author’s approach is contrasted with Alvin Goldman’s recent development of an approach to social knowledge via the idea of maximising truths. This seems to leave insufficient scope for intellectual character and autonomy. So concepts of independence, mastery, intellectual self-creation and intellectual integrity are explored in order to develop a perspective on cognitive autonomy adequate to the insights of social epistemology.Author Keywords: Autonomy; Testimony; Ideals; Epistemology; Mackie; Goldman. (shrink)

Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self–other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In (...) this paper, we will examine the hypothesis that aplasic phantom limb experience is the result of an ontogenetic interplay between body schemas and mirror neuron activity and that this interplay is founded on embedding in a social context. Phantom limb experience has been associated with the persistence of subjective experience of a part of the body after deafferentation through surgical or traumatic removal. We maintain that limited association is inconsistent with the extent to which phantom limb experience is reported by aplasic individuals. (shrink)

Linda Zagzebski’s book on epistemic authority is an impressive and stimulating treatment of an important topic. 1 I admire the way she manages to combine imagination, originality and argumentative control. Her work has the further considerable merit of bringing analytic thinking and abstract theory to bear upon areas of concrete human concern, such as the attitudes one should have towards moral and religious authority. The book is stimulating in a way good philosophy should be -- provoking both disagreement and emulation. (...) I agree with much of what she says, and have been instructed by it, but it will be of more interest and relevance here if I concentrate upon areas of disagreement. Perhaps they are better seen as areas, at least some of them, where her emphases suggest a position that seems to me untenable, but that she may not really intend. In that event, I will be happy to have provoked a clarification or the dispelling of my misunderstanding. My focus will be upon problems in her account of communal authority and autonomy, especially with respect to religious and political authority. Here my worry is that she places too much trust in trust and not enough in what I call selective mistrust. (shrink)

Tuberculosis (TB) is a potentially fatal infectious disease that, in Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ), inequitably affects Asian, Pacific, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African (MELAA), and Māori people. Medical research involving genome sequencing of TB samples enables more nuanced understanding of disease strains and their transmission. This could inform highly specific health interventions. However, the collection and management of TB isolate samples for research are currently informed by monocultural biomedical models often lacking key ethical considerations. Drawing on a qualitative kaupapa (...) Māori–consistent study, this paper reports on preliminary discussions with groups of Māori, Pacific, and Afghan people in NZ, whose communities have been harmed by TB and TB stigma. Participants’ discussions highlight key concerns and meanings that ought to inform the development of guidelines and a more robust consultative process for the governance of how TB isolate samples are collected and used both retrospectively and in future research. We argue for ethical processes to be culturally nuanced and community-generated, flexible and meaningful, and situated in relation to the physical and symbolic effects of TB. We discuss the significance of Indigenous data sovereignty, rights, and kāwanatanga (governorship) in shaping a multicultural data sovereignty model. (shrink)

Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s thinking about ethics and Christianity in his famous book Ethics, an unfinished and posthumously published work representing his most mature thought on the subject, is a fascinating attempt to combine different, and often conflicting, strands in the Christian intellectual tradition. In this article, I outline his thinking therein, analyse the advantages and disadvantages in his approach, and relate it to developments in contemporary philosophy. His critique of an excessive stress upon principles and abstraction in opposition to a concern (...) for concrete circumstances is, I argue, best seen as a necessary critique of what I call moralism rather than morality. It is also related to recent philosophical theories of particularism and the debates about ‘emergency ethics’ in current philosophy. On the negative side, Bonhoeffer has a tendency to treat non-Christian ethics as necessarily relativist and at times is excessively influenced by the elements in Christian theological tradition that are hostile to the natural and to non-Christian philosophy. In addition, his invocation of ‘the Divine mandates’ seems to have undesirable implications for some genuine values in liberal democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

Ten new essays critique the practice of armed humanitarian intervention, whereby one state sends its armed forces into another to protect citizens against major human rights abuses. The contributors examine a range of concerns, for instance about potential adverse effects and about ulterior motives.

The concept of conscience continues to play a central role in our ethical reasoning as well as in public and philosophical debate over medical ethics, religious freedom, and conscientious objection in many fields, including war. Despite this continued relevance the nature of conscience itself has remained a relatively neglected topic in recent philosophical literature. In this paper I discuss some historical background to the concept and outline the essential features required for any satisfactory account of conscience and its significance for (...) a coherent moral psychology. It will become clear that conscience is a complex concept resisting reduction to any one of its component features. In doing so I critique recent accounts of conscience which have been insufficiently attentive to these complexities and as a consequence have drawn mistaken conclusions about the legitimate role of conscience in moral reasoning. I also discuss the significance of various distortions of conscience such what I call “the fanaticised conscience”. Clarifying our concept of conscience helps us avoid both conceptual confusion in moral psychology and misapplications of the concept in our understanding of conscientious objection both theoretically and in practice. (shrink)